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THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT:
FULFILLMENT OF THE RENAISSANCE PROPHECY?
STUART L. HART*

Mankind is driven by the need to create order from chaos. Man
creates order and bestows meaning to life by imposing a world viewa set of assumptions pertaining to the environment that allows it to
be perceived in a consistently meaningful manner.
This need probably extends back to the very distant past, when
survival depended on cohesion within the group or tribe. Social structures provided these vital forces of cohesion which were essential to
survival. This process not only must have facilitated the acceptance
of tribal law but also created the need for a mythical explanation of
nature. Given the immense selective importance of such social and
religious structures over such vast stretches of time, it is difficult not
to believe they must have made an imprint on the human psyche.
Although this process of "world view formation" appears to be common to all peoples since time immemorial, it has masqueraded under
a number of different guises, including mythology, religion, theology, philosophy, and yes, science.
Although qualitatively different in its approach, science springs
from the same well of psychic need and represents only one of the
many world views. Indeed, within our own Western culture, science
has so molded our view of the cosmos that "truth" has become
synonomous with "scientifically verifiable." Once a mere intellectual
endeavor indulged in only by the most erudite (or otherwise removed
from any practical confrontations with life), science has evolved into
a way of life. In short, it now portrays reality.
It is in this light that we may analyze the significance of the
interaction between scientific development and the environmental
movement of late.
ORIGINS
From the Caves To The Greeks
The development of science has been anything but uniform in
time and place. Periods of sporadic advance have been accompanied
*Research Associate, The Institute on Man and Science, Rensselaerville, N.Y. and doctoral student, University of Michigan.
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by longer periods of stagnation. The roots of early scientific thought
can be traced to the ancient cultural centers of Babylonia, Egypt,
India, and Greece.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the time span between the
last caveman and the first Greek philosopher was anything but short.
Indeed, agricultural societies began to develop around the close of
the last ice age-10,000-12,000 years ago.' The people inhabiting
these cultures lived a life much the same as those found in the rural
areas of the world today and they saw no need to write much down.
Seen in this light, the "dark" or "middle ages" were essentially a
resumption of the way of life momentarily interrupted by Greek
culture.2
Thus, in order to comprehend the roots of the next great "cultural
interruption" (better known as the Age of Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution, or the dawning of the modern world), we are thrust
back to the Greeks and their counterpart, the Babylonians. For both
of these cultures a reasonably continuous scientific tradition can be
discerned until the last few centuries B.C. More specifically, the Babylonians developed a tradition concerned with numerical representation and arithmetic while the Greeks evolved a more logical, geometrical and pictorial scientific model.'
Greek science had an altogether different character from that of the
early civilizations; it was far more rational and abstract but it remained as far or farther removed from technical considerations....
Mathematics, especially geometry, was the field which the Greeks
esteemed most highly and 4where their methods of deduction and
proof are those we still use.

The gulf between Greece and the Near East ended as a result of
the conquests of Alexander the Great beginning in 334 B.C. It was
through Alexander that Greek culture was diffused throughout the
entire eastern Mediterranean world. As a result, one begins to discern
the entry of methods into Greek mathematics and astronomy so
arithmetical and foreign to the Greeks that they could have been lifted
only from Babylonian roots.' Greece eventually became the common heir for all ancient Near Eastern cultures, and in Greece we see
the underpinnings of science as we know it today, principally as a
result of the fortuitous combination of Greek logic and Babylonian
arithmetic."
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

L. BROWN & G. FINSTERBUSCH, MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT (1972).
R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974).
D. PRICE, SCIENCE SINCE BABYLON (1975).
J. BERNAL, SCIENCE IN HISTORY 114 (1954).
PRICE, supra note 3.
Id.
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We must be careful here to distinguish between the early or
Golden Hellenic period (before the conquests of Alexander) and the
later Hellenistic. The art, philosophy, and literature of the Golden
Hellenic age are overshadowed by the tremendous scientific vitality
of the later Hellenistic period. In the words of Robert Pirsig:
Early Greek philosophy represented the first conscious search for
what was imperishable in the affairs of men. Up to then, what was
imperishable was the domain of the Gods, the myths. But now, as a
result of the growing impartiality of the Greeks to the world around
them, there was an increasing power of abstraction which permitted
them to regard the old Greek mythos not as revealing truth but as
imaginative creations of art. This consciousness, which had never
existed anywhere before in the world, spelled a whole new level of
transcendence for the Greek civilization."
The new mythos enshrined was that of philosophy. Its principal
difference from all previous mythos was that it no longer considered
the "Immortal Principles" the exclusive domain of the gods. As a
result, an ever-growing number of philosophers became deeply interested in theories concerning nature; their ideas have been transmitted
to us by Plato and Aristotle, but with the exception of the latter,
members of this school of thought did not attain the scientific mentality as we know it today.8
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle marked the culmination of Greek
philosophical development and paradoxically signaled its arrest. As
the classical city-states began their decline, the progression of
thought began to decay. The mystical idealism espoused by Socrates
and Plato gave way to a growing conformity of thought spurred on
by the continuous deterioration of the social order. The teachings of
Aristotle especially reflected the increasingly mundane concerns of
philosophy. A vivid example of this is Aristotle's idea of "final
causes," which taught the acceptance of life as it was and had nothing to offer to those who found it intolerable, except that their
sufferings were inevitable and were part of the great order of
nature. 9
Although both Plato and Aristotle posited the a priori existence of
immutable and external "truths" or "ideas," the philosophy of Plato
was much more preoccupied with the metaphysical qualities of existence (i.e. with the "ideas" per se). Aristotle was less concerned with
the actual "ideas" and more concerned with their mortal appearance.
He held that the appearances of ideas had to cling to something
7. PIRSIG, supra note 2, at 366.
8. A. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (2d ed. 1967).
9. BERNAL, supra note 4.
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which was independent
of them and this "something" he named
"substance." 1 0 It was at that moment that the dichotomy between
mind and matter, inner and outer, and subjective and objective was
established, and our scientific understanding of reality was born. 1 '
From The Romans To The Renaissance
The Hellenistic Age came to an end when the Romans conquered
the Eastern empires Alexander had established. The Romans had
been engaged in a slow but persistent conquest of the entire Mediterranean world for nearly 500 years. The year 31 B.C. is usually taken
as the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Roman
Empire.1 2
The decadence of Roman culture as it developed under the empire
held no real place for scientific advancement. The accumulation of
great power and wealth in the hands of a few combined with Stoicism to create an atmosphere in which there was little incentive for
science, save the perpetuation of certain general ideas of Greek origin
which supported the prevailing "class rule" society.' I Consequently,
the major contribution to the development of science made by the
Romans was that of effectively spreading the ideas of the Greeks
throughout the Mediterranean world.
With the establishment of a second capitol at Constantinople and
the subsequent division of the empire into two parts-the western
part governed by Rome and the eastern part by Constantinople-we
begin to witness increased tension between East and West. The differences were aggravated as Constantinople successfully resisted barbarian attacks and preserved the continuity of classical culture, while
the Western empire broke up and was so reduced that it was centuries before many of its territories were recaptured.'4 As a result,
most of the legacy of knowledge handed down from the Greeks was
lost by Europe and the heritage of Greece returned to the East from
which it had come. In Syria, Persia, India, and even China, new
breaths of science stirred and came together in a brilliant synthesis
under the banner of Islam.' I From the eighth century through the
13th, the fire burned bright and much was added in all fields of
learning.
After the fall of the Western empire, scientific inquiry did not
10. PIRSIG, supra note 2.

11. Id.
12. BERNAL, supra note 4.

13. Id.
14. H. BUTTERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE (1957).
15. BERNAL, supra note 4.
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cease in Europe-it simply turned once again towards mysticism and
religion derived from the more mystical aspects of Plato's idealism.
Various forms of Gnosticism were highly prevalent during this
time.' 6 Feudalism was the economic system throughout most of
Europe during the Middle Ages. The Roman Catholic Church provided the intellectual expression during this period, in addition to
serving an important administrative function. As a time when men
looked not to this world but to the hereafter for salvation, the Middle
Ages furnished little positive incentive for bona fide scientific development (although scientific inquiry did persist among the rich in a
limited capacity).' I'
Consequently, the roots of modern Western science originate not
from medieval Europe, but instead can be traced to Byzantium and
the many other cultures which come to form the world of Islam.'8
Two factors were critically important in the conversion of scientific
leadership from East to West. First, the descendants of the Asiatic
invaders responsible for the fall of Rome nearly 1,000 years before,
now were putting great pressure on Constantinople and all of the
East. A succession of invading hordes, including the Huns and Avars,
eventually culminated in the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, and the conquests of the Ottoman Turks shortly thereafter.' 9
From the 10th century on, these same Asiatics were unable to break
into Europe again, though for centuries they had tried to carry their
depredations as far west as possible. The 10th century, therefore,
represents something like a restoration of stability. It represents the
time from which Western civilization begins to make its remarkable
advance.2 o
The second factor crucial to assumption of scientific leadership in
the West can be traced to the 12th century and the translation of
Arabic, Islamic, and Greek scientific works into Latin. This so-called
"age of the great translators" stemmed primarily from the linguistic
and cultural melting pots of Sicily, Toledo, and a few other places in
Moorish Spain. 2 ' Thus, the corpus of classical learning with its vast
Islamic overlays became known in European universities during the
12th and 13th centuries and led immediately to a furious upswing in
academic activity.2 2
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. BUTTERFIELD,supra note 14.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. PRICE, supra note 3.
22. Id.
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From that point on, the dominant philosophical influence in
Europe was that of Aristotle.2 I The rediscovery of Aristotle and the
translation of the leading Islamic thinkers brought to the Christian
medieval thinkers, for the first time, a developed system of thought
which owed nothing to Christianity. Indeed, Aristotle came to be
known as "the philosopher" and his system came to be synonomous
with philosophy itself.2" This phenomenon occurred not so much
because of preference for Aristotelianism, but because it was the
only great system of philosophy of which the medievals possessed
extensive knowledge.
The rediscovery of Aristotle raised the problem of the relationship
between theology and philosophy in a far more acute manner than it
had previously assumed in the early Middle Ages.
When some of the theologians in the thirteenth century adopted a
hostile attitude to Aristotle and regarded his philosophy as being in
many respects an intellectual menace, they were rejecting independent philosophy in the name of the Christian faith. And when St.
Thomas Aquinas adopted in great measure the Aristotelian system,
he was giving a charter to philosophy. He should not be regarded as
burdening Christian thought with the system of a particular Greek
philosopher. The deeper significance of his action was that he recognized the rights and position of philosophy as a rational study distinct from theology. 2 It can be said, therefore, that the rediscovery of Aristotle in the
Middle Ages and its subsequent reconciliation with Christian theology in the 13th century by St. Thomas Aquinas was the distant
preparation for later scientific advance. By condoning the pursuit of
knowledge in areas completely separate from Christian theology (although by no means accepting its validity), Aquinas paved the way
for increasing amounts of study which transcended the scholasticism
of earlier medieval thought.
Indeed, one can go even further and say that the development of
Greek philosophy under the Christian doctrine of the world's creation by God provided a theological preparation for the advancement
of science. 2 6 For if the world is a creation, and if matter is not evil
but good, then the material world is obviously worth investigation.
But scientific investigation could not develop until the right method
was found; and for that, Christian Europe had to wait many centuries.
23. F. COPLESTON, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: LATE MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY (1963).
24. Id.

25. Id. at 239.
26. COPLESTON, supra note 23.
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SCIENCE, RELIGION & ENLIGHTENMENT
A common feature of the religions that dominated the ancient
world was the belief that all natural objects and places possessed
"spirits." These "genius loci" had to be honored in order to insure
the religious sanction of a given activity, and before using natural
objects for human use, man was required to placate the spirits
through gifts and ceremonies.2 " The Judeo-Christian religions, however, maintained that "spirit" was not intrinsic to objects of nature
but instead, ruled them from without. It also taught that to some
extent, man shared God's transcendence of nature.' 8 Indeed, the
Book of Genesis announced the sovereignty of God over the universe
and concomitantly, the dominion of man over earth.
Thus Lynn White in his article, "The Historical Roots of Our
Ecological Crisis," concludes that "the spirits in natural objects
which formerly had protected nature from man evaporated. Man's
effective monopoly on spirit in this world was confirmed, and the
old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled." 2 9 Although
White's observations certainly appear to be plausible, he fails to recognize the prevailing attitudes of the early European Renaissance,
nor does he take into account the novel characteristics of the emerging form of scientific inquiry-that of natural or experimental philosophy. Through the work of early Renaissance "scientists," natural
philosophy came to occupy a place alongside theology and philosophy. As it grew, the common definition of "knowledge" began to
shift gradually. In keeping with this trend, interest in things of this
world became more pronounced at the onset of the Renaissance.
And as a result a more self-conscious and self-confident attitude
toward artisanship, invention, and technology began to emerge.3 0
Despite changing attitudes, however, Aristotelianism continued to
be a dominant force in shaping men's attitudes toward nature, particularly his doctrine of "final causes." As Clarence Glacken explains:
[M] ost of the great names in early modern science did not deny
design in nature nor the validity of final causes, but there were
differences in the enthusiasm with which these were applied to immediate problems. The Copernican theory had not called the creation into question; the cosmic system was a product of divine design
and order. Galileo deftly said that to prohibit the teachings of
Copernican astronomy would be but to censure a hundred passages
27.
28.
29.
30.

White, The HistoricalRoots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCI. 3767 (1967).
W. LEISS, THE DOMINATION OF NATURE (1972).
WHITE, supra note 27.
C. GLACKEN, TRACES ON THE RHODIAN SHORE (1976).
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of Holy Scripture which teach us that the glory and greatness of
Almighty God are marvelously discerned in the open book of
Heaven.3
Kepler and Newton held similarly strong teleological beliefs concerning the scientific investigation of nature (i.e. the belief that all things
are moving in an immutable fashion towards predetermined ends).
Indeed, teleology was one of the great preoccupations of Western
theology, philosophy and science. 3 2
Hence for the early Renaissance scientist, the surrounding world
of nature held a purpose entirely apart from its function as the
material basis of human activity; it was a divine creation and therefore sacred. The earth's value as a source of satisfaction for vital
human needs was tempered by the realization that nature was a
visible testimony of God's providence and therefore must be treated
with some semblance of care.3 And, although the epistemological
foundations of theology and natural philosophy were becoming more
and more distant, the prevailing influence of the Christian faith was
still so strong it totally colored both the content and intent of scientific investigation.
FRANCIS BACON AND THE METHODOLOGY OF HUMAN BETTERMENT
Compared to the corpus of knowledge available to Europe in the
12th and 13th centuries, the amount of sustained scientific investigation was rather small. However, by the early 16th century, interest in
such pursuits as natural philosophy and scientific research had grown
tremendously. And there can be little doubt that what rescued scientific learning was the invention of printing and its rapid growth in
Europe from 1470 onwards.3 4
As the pace of scientific investigation quickened it also fought to
separate itself from the prevailing practices of magic, alchemy, and
astrology. This was especially true of the areas of mathematics,
astronomy, and physics. Aristotle's ancient theories of motion and
cosmology had been all but supplanted by the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and later Galileo. The purpose of these great intellectual inquiries, however, continued to be religious in nature and associated with the wisdom of the Creator, His individual productions of
nature, and the interrelationships He had established among them.3s
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 377.
GLACKEN, supra note 30.
LEISS, supra note 28.
PRICE, supra note 3.
GLACKEN, supra note 30.
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There was, nonetheless, a growing optimism throughout the Renaissance that man's accumulating knowledge was increasing his control over the creation.3 6 Of all the Enlightenment thinkers, none had
a greater impact on the nature of scientific investigation than Sir
Francis Bacon.
For Bacon, science was not a luxury to be indulged in after human
needs were satisfied, a detached contemplation, or an aspiring towards truth. This, however, was the picture which had come down
through the centuries, and if the paint had worn a little thin in
places, it was still basically the same. Aristotle was the most coherent exponent of this view of science which stemmed from the economic structure of society where slaves made mechanical devices
unnecessary or even useless, and where contempt for the worker was
extended to the work itself, depriving it of all cultural value. 3 7
Indeed, technological applications traditionally were considered
lower class, empirical, and action-oriented while natural scientific
investigation was considered aristocratic, speculative, and intellectual
in intent.3 8
For Bacon, the purpose of scientific research was neither to
acquire fame nor to produce miracles, but to improve the conditions
of human existence, and he believed that this could be achieved
through the systematic application of scientific theory to technology. 3 9 Bacon aimed at changing prevailing cultural and philosophical
attitudes in addition to affecting drastic institutional reforms. His
acrimonious condemnation of classical philosophers as well as their
imitators of medieval and Renaissance times attested to his novel
concept of "truth." He did not wish to replace the old ways with a
new philosophy based on the same principles but instead, he sought
an entirely new attitude toward nature involving new principles and
different aims-in short, a new ethic.4 0
According to Bacon, philosophy is the work of human reason and
falls into three main divisions. The first is concerned with God, the
second with nature, and the third with man. The divisions of philosophy, he said, are like the branches of a tree united in a common
trunk. This "one universal science," which is the mother of the rest,
is known as "first philosophy."'"'
Bacon divides the philosophy of nature into speculative and opera36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
P. ROSSI, FRANCIS BACON: FROM MAGIC TO SCIENCE 25 (1968).
WHITE, supra note 27.
LEISS, supra note 28.
ROSSI, supra note 37.
COPLESTON, supra note 23.
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tive natural philosophy. Speculative natural philosophy is subdivided
into physics and metaphysics. Physics treats efficient and material
causes while metaphysics treats formal and final causes. Operative
natural philosophy is the application of the former and it falls into
two main parts: mechanics and magic. Mechanics is the application
of physics in practice, while magic is applied metaphysics.4 2 Thus,
Bacon wedded God, nature, man, formal and final causes, and efficient and material causes into one integrated philosophical system.
At the same time, however, Bacon's preoccupation with the practical improvement of the human condition led him to declare that
"inquiry into final causes is sterile and like a virgin consecrated to
God, produces nothing."'4 3 He saw the blind allegiance to the philosophical systems of antiquity as the major stumbling block to human
betterment. In his own words: "It is idle to expect any great advancement in science from the superinducing and engrafting of new
things upon old. We must begin anew from the very foundations,
unless we would revolve forever in a circle with mean and contemptible progress."'
Bacon's perception of the problem extended to the very heart of
the classical notion of truth-the process of deduction:
There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most
general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes
for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other
derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual
and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms
last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried.4 s
Although Bacon called for the establishment of a system of knowledge based on true induction, he did not deny that some sort of
induction had been known previously and employed. What he objected to was rash and hasty generalization, resting on no firm basis
in experience. Bacon explained:
In establishing axioms, another form of induction must be devised
than has hitherto been employed, and it must be used for proving
and discovering not first principles (as they are called) only, but also
the lesser axioms, and the middle, and indeed all.. . . For the lower
axioms differ but slightly from bare experience, while the highest
42. Id.

43. Id. at 108.
44. F. BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 46 (1960).

45. Id. at 43.
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and most general (which we now have) are notional and abstract and
without solidity. But the middle are the true and solid4 and
living
6
axioms, on which depend the affairs and fortunes of men.
In essence then, Bacon rejected the process of deduction on the
grounds that true knowledge must rise in the observation of things,
of particular facts or events. This was totally in keeping with the
generally anti-rationalistic mood of the Renaissance, which stressed
the return to stubborn fact and called for the overthrow of the
stringently rationalistic characteristics of medieval scholasticism. "
Bacon not only called for the reorganization of scientific investigation methods, but also envisioned the establishment of "organized
scientific research" based on the induction process. This landmark
idea possessed him for his entire life. He had drafted several proposals for such an operation during his years in government before
finally setting down, in old age, his vision of the ideal research establishment in New Atlantis (1627). Within 50 years of Bacon's death,
educational reformers influenced by New Atlantis began organizing
technical schools to facilitate the instruction of the mechanical arts.
The Royal Society (chartered 1662) as well as the Academie des
Sciences in France both acknowledged the inspiration of Francis
Bacon.4 8
Bacon's concept of the "mastery of nature" through scientific
research, although readily acknowledged by modem scholars as the
most fundamental element in Bacon's philosophy, unfortunately is
the least understood of all of his doctrines. When modem man attempts to understand Bacon's idea of the "mastery of nature," he
unavoidably imposes his own world-view of 20th century technocracy, international pollution problems, and potential nuclear annihilation. What he does not understand is just how steeped with moral
obligation and deep religious conviction Bacon's new philosophy
really was.
As observed above, Bacon's philosophy of nature was intimately
intertwined with Christian theology. In his view, the fall of man from
Paradise was of decisive importance in the subsequent history of
both man and nature. Religion and science were engaged in a mutual
effort to compensate for the damage incurred as a result of the fall:
"For man, by the fall, fell at the same time from his state of innocence and from his dominion over creation. Both of these losses,
however, can even in this life be in some part repaired; the former by
46. Id. at 98.
47. WHITEHEAD, supra note 8.
48. LEISS, supra note 28.
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religion and faith, and the latter by arts and science." '4 9 Thus, science was reconciled with God's plan. The religious frame of reference
provided the guarantee that the proposed expansion of the arts and
sciences would not lead to uncontrollable upheavals.' 0 We see this
idea in the following passage from New Organon: "Only let the
human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by
divine bequest, and let power be given it; the exercise thereof will be
governed by sound reason and true religion.""
Indeed, there is no hint by Bacon that the environmental changes
wrought by "conquering" nature ever might be undesirable:
I would address one general admonition to all-that they consider
what are the true ends of knowlege, and that they seek it not either
for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to
others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any other of these inferior things, but for the5 benefit and use of life and that they perfect
and govern it in charity. 2
It thus seems that Bacon saw the religious application of science as
being nothing but potentially beneficial: "The end of our foundation
is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the
enlarging of the bounds of human empire, the effecting of all things
possible."5 I
A measure of Bacon's success is indicated by the fact that his
concept of "conquering" nature by means of science and technology
has become a commonly accepted notion in modern society. As I
suggested above, however, the actual meaning of the phrase has
shifted gradually over the centuries and now elicits an entirely different set of responses than it did in the early 1600s. This shifting
context of religious, political, and economic factors has resulted in a
modern frame of reference which serves to effectively detract from
the initial humanitarian, moral, and religious aspects of Bacon's great
methodological synthesis.'5
THE SECULARIZATION OF SCIENCE
The outstanding achievement of the various proponents of new
methodologies such as Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo was that their
49. BACON, supra note 44, at 247-48.
50. LEISS, supra note 28.
51. BACON, supra note 44, at 119.
52. F. BACON, THE GREAT INSTAURATION 15 (1901).
53. F. BACON, THE NEW ATLANTIS 119 (1901).
54. See Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. &
THEORY 3 (1969) for a discussion of historical interpretation.
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formulations of the concept of human mastery over nature were
much clearer than those that existed before.5 ' And as a result of the
prominence of these men, science was gradually wedded to the predominant cultural force of the time-Christianity. The precise way in
which Bacon reformulated the scientific method was crucial in this
respect since Christianity's hold on the European consciousness
remained strong even as the traditional social basis of organized religion was being eroded by capitalism.' 6 By casting his thesis for
scientific and technological progress in a familiar religious mold, he
succeeded in winning wide acceptance of his novel concept. But at
the same time he unknowingly charted a course of resource exploitation, environmental degradation, and world power struggle for later
generations as the decline of Christian influence led to the eventual
secularization of his ideas:
If we look for the root of the error that was in him-the cause that
was perhaps behind the other causes-it lay in his assumption that
the number of phenomena, the number even of possible experiments, was limited, so that the scientific
revolution could be ex5
pected to take place in a decade or two. 7
In this sense, the "mastery of nature" was to Bacon a finite conversion process-a conversion from what he perceived to be the culturally inherited ignorance of the ancients to the religious application
of truth that was at the heart of his new methodology.
The gradual realization that the scientific revolution was not a
discrete process of conversion, but rather an infinite process of accretion and revision, had a profound impact on the eventual role of
science. The idea of truth established by Bacon as a finite and immutable set of laws revealed by the proper execution of scientific
method was transformed into an elusive process of infinite possibilities. This realization materialized in the "philosophy of doubt"
which began with Descartes and reached its full development in
Cartesian doubt.' I In direct contrast to Greek philosophy, in which
reality was revealed through the contemplative glance-of the beholder,
the outstanding characteristic of Cartesian doubt was that nothingno thought and no experience-could escape it.' 9 It could only be a
matter of time before Cartesian doubt was carried directly to the
heart of the Christian faith itself. Indeed, the introduction of doubt
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

LEISS, supra note 28.
Id
BUTTERFIELD, supra note 14, at 116.
H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
Id.
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to the realm of religious belief by Pascal and Kierkegaard, two of the
greatest religious thinkers of modernity, served to undermine the
Christian faith in a way not easily refutable by traditional theologythrough the doubting concerns with salvation of genuinely religious
60
men.
The linear and historical nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition
also becomes exceedingly important at this juncture. Whereas most
archaic religions believe in the cyclical nature of time (i.e. cosmic
cycles), the Judeo-Christian tradition perceives time as having a
beginning and an end. As a result, historical events take on religious
significance and "history" becomes "sacred history." 6 1 But as the
idea of linear time becomes secularized, it takes on a wholly different
character. In fact, it has been suggested that the modem idea of
"progress" owes something to the fact that Christianity had provided
a meaning for history and a grand purpose to which the whole creation moved. In other words, the idea of "progress" represents the
secularization of an attitude, initially religious, which looked to a
fullfillment in some future, far-off event, and saw history, therefore,
62
as definitely leading to something.
By the beginning of the 18th century, we begin to notice the
manifestation of this secularization process as, more and more, doubt
is cast on the implications of "final causes" and its efficacy as a tool
for the advancement of science. The writings of Hume, Goethe, and
Kant all argue in varying degrees against the held belief of teleology
63
in nature, and they posit new ideas concerning man's relation to it.
Of all the writings of this period, Kant's ideas had the greatest
impact upon the prevailing man-nature ideology set down by Bacon,
Descartes, and other 17th century natural philosophers. Kant's most
penetrating arguments concerning the order, design, and place of
man in nature are found in his Critique of Teleological Judgment
(1790). He essentially called for the rejection of the cosmological
and teleological proofs of natural philosophy. For Kant, the increasing intervention of man in nature cast increasing doubt on the
traditional teleological explanation. As Kant said, "the freedom of
man's causality enables him to adapt physical things to the purposes
'64
he has in view."
If nature as a whole were governed by final causes, Kant argued,
then every part of nature would demonstrate this. "But a more exact
knowledge of the constitution of this basis of all organic production
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indicates no other causes than those working quite indesignedly,
causes which rather destroy the favor the production of order and
purpose." '6 I Kant therefore concluded that regardless of the many
fortuitous conveniences of nature in supporting life, the physical
phenomena were not the result of purposeful design but result instead from "the effects of volcanic eruptions or of inundations of the
oceans.,6 6
The writings of these 18th century philosophers of "secondary
causes" were at the heart of the emerging disciplines of natural history and later, positivism. 6 7 Natural history was distinct from
natural or experimental philosophy in that it completely dispensed
with any notion of final causes and in doing so, effectively secularized scientific investigation from any religious, moral, or ethical
encumbrances which were the very crux of the methodology set
down by Francis Bacon. The sustained effect of this process of
"demythologizing" into modem times ended by stripping the cosmos
of all inherent purpose. Nature, for example, becomes a collection of
bodies in eternally lawful motion whereas once it had represented an
omnipresent mystery of great religious significance. Mircea Eliade
elaborates on this in his book, The Sacred and the Profane:
For the non-religious men of the modern age, the cosmos has become opaque, inert, mute; it transmits no message, it holds no
cipher. ... Their religious experience is no longer open to the
cosmos. In the last analysis, it is a strictly private experience; salvation is a problem that concerns man and his God; at most, man
recognizes that he is responsible not only to God but also to history.
But in these man-God-history relationships, there is no place for the
cosmos. From this, it would appear that even for a genuine Christian, the world is no longer felt as the work of God. 6 8
Carl Jung also offers some interesting thoughts pertaining to the
secularization of science:
The conflict between science and religion is in reality a misunderstanding of both. Scientific materialism has merely introduced a new
hypothesis, and that is an intellectual sin. It has given another name
to the supreme principle of reality and has assumed that it created a
new thing and destroyed an old. Whether you call the principle of
existence "God," "matter," "energy," or anything else you like, you
have created nothing; you have simply changed a symbol.6 9
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In this sense, man has simply supplanted religion with science as the
life force of modem society. The consequence of this view is to set
the relationship of man and the world in the context of domination;
man either must submit to these natural laws or attempt to master
them; since they possess no purpose, or at least none we can underof reconciling his objectives with those
stand, there is no possibility
0
of the natural order.7
In summary then, when the concept of the conquest of nature is
thoroughly secularized, the ethical limitations implicit in the pact
between God and man lose their efficacy. The religious casing in
which Bacon and other Enlightenment reformers embedded their
ideas gradually fell away under the onslaught of subsequent scientific
and philosophical endeavor, but the idea itself emerged intact and, in
secular dress, sparked the widespread practices of exploitation found
in later periods. 1I What concealed the crisis until the 20th century
was the continued importance of religion, which managed to keep
the structure of moral values in some state of repair despite the
changing social and intellectual climate. But the overwhelming success of the marriage between industry and the new science, and the
growing authority of the scientific methodology, spelled inevitable
defeat for the traditional scheme of religiously based ethics.7 2 For
Bacon and his contemporaries, religion had provided the framework
for understanding science as a human activity. The failure of that
link in modern times is largely responsible for the world-wide political, social, and environmental crises we are faced with today.
SCIENCE AND THE NEW WORLD
The widespread acceptance of science as a tool for human betterment, discussed above, was paralleled in time by the opening of the
New World by European explorers. In fact, it can be said that the
new Western frontier provided the fuel for the emerging technological machine. As Walter Prescott Webb explains in his book, The
Great Frontier: "[T] he sudden acquisition of land, and other forms
of wealth by the people of Europe precipitated a boom on Western
73
civilization, and the boom lasted as long as the frontier was open."
The institutions established during this boom, Webb points out,
therefore were adapted to boom conditions. "It was in this atmosphere and under these conditions that democracy, capitalism, and
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individualism of the modem type come to their dominant position.""7
When one couples the declining influence of religion with the
exploding importance of technology, it is evident just how instrumental the resource pool of the New World (especially America) was
in determining the future characteristics of industrial society. Therefore it is not surprising that the closing of the western frontier in the
late 1800s had a decided effect on a civilization that had based its
culture on perpetual expansion, achieved through the implementation of seemingly inexhaustible resources from the New World frontier.7 S Hence, we observe in the United States the emergence of the
Progressive Conservation Movement sparked by Gifford Pinchot and
Theodore Roosevelt-a movement derived from "the fear of running
out of resources and losing the competitive edge in international
politics."'7 6 Thus, the Progressive movement was basically an elite
scientific movement geared toward the efficient use of resources to
guarantee sustained economic well-being; it was not particularly concemed with the more general questions of quality of life or the quality of the environment. 7
It is not until the 1960s that we observe a new and much different
impulse concerning the environment and man's relation to it.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
Although the term "ecology" had been used for decades by professional people, it became a household item only in the late 1960s.
The explosion of popular concern over environmental issues provided
the impetus for a new environmental movement unprecedented in its
approach to problems of man and his relation to nature.
The roots of this movement are as diverse as they are numerous.
However, in the broadest sense, ecological thinking came down from
Darwin, who gave in his Origin of Species (1859), a never-to-beforgotten example of the relatedness of apparently unconnected
organisms.7 8 Darwin's concept of the "web of life" served as a harbinger for the infant discipline of ecology.
With the rudiments of a science set down to deal with the relationship of living things to their environment, what emerged next was the
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clear perception of a problem. In this context, the appearance in
1864 of George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature marked a turning
point in man's conception of his own actions. Better summarized by
its subtitle, "The Earth as Modified by Human Action," Marsh's
treatise was the catalyzing force in the conversion of the realization
that human activities might have adverse environmental consequences into an organized movement. If Darwin and Marsh provided
the ecological and practical bases for developing environmental concerns, the transcendantalists, best exemplified by Emerson and
Thoreau, provided the ethical justification. Derived primarily from
Romanticism, transcendentalism looked to nature for the source of
distinct departure from the traditional
spiritual enlightenment-a
79
Judeo-Christian ethic.
Today's environmental concerns thus can be attributed to the expansion, embellishment, and intermingling of the three basic sources
discussed above. The impulse for the movement, however, cannot be
compared with any other: it went far beyond the Progressive doctrine of efficient resource utilization and did not stop with the prospect of ugliness in the world. The new driving impulse transcended
concern for quality of life to fear for life itself. Americans came to
realize that man was vulnerable. More precisely, they began to see
man as part of a larger community of life, dependent for his survival
on the integrity of ecosystems and on the health of the total environment. Man, in short, was rediscovered as being part of nature. 8 0
The awareness of environmental degradation grew rapidly in the
preachings of such people as Rachel Carson, 8 Barry Commoner,8 2
Paul Ehrlich8" and Garrett Hardin. 8" But the awakening of the early
1960s represented only a politico-scientific awakening. It told us that
mankind's survival depended upon halting certain forms of environmental degradation. It questioned only the presence of these problems and sought their elimination. It did not concern itself with the
underlying reasons for these problems and to this extent, dealt only
with the external symptoms of a much more fundamental social and
cultural problem. Gradually, it came to be realized that environmental crises, like other social problems, emerge when the traditional
social myths and rhetoric are questioned and new ones compete for
their replacement. 8 S
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It was not until the early 1970s, however, that the environmental
issue came full circle and was transformed into essentially an ethical
and ideological controversy. This metamorphosis came at least partially as a result of the widespread infusion of the middle 1960s
counterculture movement into the environmental arena.8 6 Woodstock proved to be more than simply a large scale rock concert and a
forum for anti-war sentiments. It simultaneously marked the dissolution of the counterculture movement and the sublimation of its
energies, goals, and beliefs into a more tangible and hence, socially
condoned movement of "participatory ecology." Less than a year
later in April of 1970, the new environmental movement was officially celebrated by Earth Day. The fundamental feature of this
movement, which distinguished it from any previous conservation
effort, was the belief that saving the environment is impossible without changes in the economic, social, and ideological fabric of the
modem world. The new movement extended the "new conservation"
from the physical environment to the social and cultural
one-from
8 7
man's effects on nature to his strategies for managing it.
As writers from the various schools of the environmental movement recognized one connection or another between the environment and some other field or discipline, the realm of ecological study
quickly spread to every facet of society. Such an ecological approach
can be seen developing in the writings of Aldo Leopold (whose book,
A Sand County Almanac8 8 is still considered to be the classic statement of the land ethic) and later, the admonitions of Rachel Carson
and Barry Commoner discussed above. Finally in the 1970s we see
the ecological approach coalescing with such diverse individuals as
Buckminster Fuller, Ian McHarg, Rene Dubos, and Max Nicholson.
Fuller, whose professed field is that of "comprehensive anticipatory design science," has revolutionized the approach to architecture
and design through the application of ecological and biological principles. His concepts of "ephemeralization" and "doing more with
less" have become accepted ideals within the ever-widening body of
environmental literature.8 9 Similarly, Ian McHarg, head of the
Department of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning at the
'
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University of Pennsylvania, initiated a new approach to land-use planning known as "physiographic determinism" or "design with
nature." 9 o He simply proposed to change the usual order of planning
procedure and start with a presumption for nature by first identifying those areas most important to natural processes. Rene Dubos, an
eminent microbiologist, has gone so far as to seek the adoption of
ecological principles in relation to viruses and other microorganisms. 1 Finally, Max Nicholson has called for the application of
ecological principles to human affairs in hopes it may overcome the
dilemmas associated with traditional forms of social order and offer a
more natural, constructive, and diverse life style. 9 2
Thus, the ecological crisis can be seen not merely as an imbalance
in the biological system produced by man, nor simply a problem of
exhausted, misused, or dirtied resources. It is a crisis resulting directly from man's own social ecology-his science, his technology,
and his culture.' 3 Jacques Monod, in his book, Chance and Necessity, elucidates this problem all too clearly:
Modern societies accepted the treasures and the power that science
laid in their laps. But they have not accepted-they have scarcely
even heard-its profounder message: the defining of a new and
unique source of truth, and the demand for a thorough revision of
ethical premises. ... Armed with all the powers, enjoying all the

riches they owe to science, our societies are still trying to live by
and to teach systems of values already blasted at the root by science
itself.... What ails the modern spirit is this lie gripping man's moral
and social nature at the very core. It is this ailment, more or less
confusedly diagnosed, that provokes the fear if not hatred-in any
case the estrangement-felt toward scientific culture by so many
people today. Their aversion, when openly expressed, usually directs
itself at the technological by-products of science:
the bomb, the
94
destruction of nature, the soaring population.
Thus, the fearful recognition of overt technological destruction
serves only as an indicator of a much more deep-seated disorder. The
core of this disorder lies in the dualism between "objective truth" or
science on the one hand, and subjective values or ethics on he other.
The former cannot function properly unless it is grounded in the
latter. Hence,
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[T] he way to solve the conflict between human values and technological needs is not to run away from technology. That's impossible.
The way to resolve the conflict is to break down the barriers of
dualistic thought that prevent a real understanding of what technology is-not an exploitation of nature, but a fusion of nature and the
human spirit into a new kind of creation that transcends both. 9 s
Such is the potential function of ecology. Ecology is the great
connector. The processes of ecology are not power seeking, or absolutist. Instead, the ways of ecology are searching, realistic, and
constructive,
but they are also widely-tolerant of variety and individ96
uality.
The environmental revolution thus can be likened to the European
Renaissance. As in the Renaissance, a fresh dynamic is arising partly
from the revolt of individuals against archaic laws, rules, and conventions, and partly from the disillusionment and contempt at the great
gulf between the stated intentions of established institutions and
their actual conduct and results. Most importantly, however, the
environmental movement, like the Renaissance, seeks to return to
"stubborn fact"-to narrow the gap between scientific nature and
intuited nature. Over the course of 200 years, science has become
increasingly abstract and, as such, has become virtually separated
from the everyday perception of the world. Modern science seeks to
define the structure and processes of nature in ideal or mathematical
terms; the result is that the life-world is relegated to the realm of
purely subjective experience from the viewpoint of science, despite
9
the fact that this is the world in which all human activity occurs. 7
Thus the environmental revolution, by returning to "stubborn facts,"
seeks somehow to reconcile the workings of a highly abstract scientific and technological machine with the limitations and preferences
of the world of everyday experience.
As such, the new environmental movement represents an attempt
to reinstate a mode of control over scientific and technological development-the fulfillment of the Baconian creed so long without
means of ethical control. As previously discussed, the Baconian formulation of the idea of human dominance over nature is internally
consistent only in a religious context. But as the foundations of this
idea have become increasingly secularized, neither reason nor religion
have been capable of guiding the search for power over nature and of
preventing such activities from becoming self-destructive. Contrary
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to Bacon's great expectations, modern scientific and technological
rationality have failed to escape the hold of more powerful mechanisms kept in motion by irrational social conditions.9 8
Bacon's concept presumes a link between the increasing control of
external nature and a complementary element of human self-control
which would serve as a guide to the social application of this power.
Such a doctrine has proven inoperative in the absence of effective
religious and/or ethical controls; instead it has resulted in the exploitation of nature as well as man. As William Burch points out, it
seems that "when men not gods make miracles, the good works
always contain the seeds of human terror, and it is a terror all the
more frightening because we feel that we should understand it. Thus
rationality tends to become the most terrifying of irrationalities." 9
To transcend this dilemma means not to reject the entire situation,
but rather to preserve its positive elements within the outlines of a
new formulation that will serve us better.
This, then, is the real significance of the new environmental movement-it provides the parascientific ethics through which science
again can be applied humanistically to technology. It provides the
link between "progress" and quality. In essence, it is a new religion
of self-restraint through ecological awareness, a theology of the
earth, a perception of every person's undeniable link with the ever
shrinking capacity of "spaceship earth."
The overt sanctions of this new mode of self-restraint are fundamentally different from those envisioned by Bacon-the precepts of
ecology rather than the decrees of God. But perhaps they are not so
very different after all. The general effect is the same; a reverence for
life in all its guises as a manifestation of a single, unified, creative
process. The one truly fundamental difference, however, is that in
the ecological ethic, man himself disposes of the powers of life or
death over the other species, whereas in the earlier scheme, only God
could have withdrawn the license to live from any of His creations.1 00
The responsibility for maintaining all forms of life is now totally
human. May God help us.
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